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Abstract: We separately identify two mechanisms underlying peer eects in farm households’ adoption of a
new crop. A farmer can follow his peers to adopt a new crop because he learns knowledge about the new crop
from them (social learning) and because he wants to avoid the damage caused by the practice conflicting with
theirs (externalities). Using an agent-based model, we simulate the two mechanisms on a multiplex network
consisting of two types of social relationships. The simulation model is estimated using detailed data of social
networks, adoption and relevant socio-economic characteristics from 10 villages in China. We find that social
learning – in this case, the sharing of experiential resources – among family members and production exter-
nalities between contiguous land plots both significantly influence farmers’ adoption. Furthermore, sharing
of experiential resources plays a significant role in the entire diusion process and dominates the early phase,
whereas externalities only matter in the late phase. This study shows the roles peer eects play in shaping
diusion can occur through dierent mechanisms and can vary as the diusion proceeds. The work also sug-
gests that agent-based models can help disentangle the role of social interactions in promoting or hindering
diusion.
Keywords: Peer Eects, Social Networks, Diusion of Innovation, High-Value Crop
Introduction
1.1 Social scientists have long been interested in understanding the influence of social interactions on economic
behaviours. One area that has been intensively studied is peer eects in the diusion of innovations (Rogers
2003). Peer eects have been found in people’s adoption of innovations in many fields including agriculture
(e.g., Ryan&Gross 1943;Rogers 1970;Munshi 2004;Conley&Udry2010), health (e.g., Colemanetal. 1966;Rogers
& Kincaid 1981; Valente & Saba 1998; Christakis & Fowler 2007) and finance (e.g., Banerjee et al. 2013; Bursztyn
et al. 2014). Recent literature shows increasing interest in investigating how peer eects occur, rather than sim-
ply whether peer eects occur overall, by looking into the underlying mechanisms through which peer eects
take place. A significant body of studies focuses on social learning (e.g., Munshi 2004; Bandiera & Rasul 2006;
Conley &Udry 2010; Genius et al. 2014), in which “learning” is broadly defined as the uptake of new information
(Foster & Rosenzweig 2010). The information can be the awareness about the existence of the innovation or
the knowledge about the feasibility or profitability of the innovation. These dierent types of information oen
transmit through dierent channels and can play dierent roles in shaping a diusion process. For example,
Banerjee et al. (2013) find the transmission of awareness information has a significant influence on farmers’ de-
cisions to take up micro-credit, but the interactions with regard to other types of information do not. Another
body of literature examines the role of externalities, showing peers’ adoption behaviour can positively or neg-
atively aect individuals’ payo from current choice and thus discourage or motivate the individuals to adopt
(e.g., Abdulai & Human 2005; den Broeck & Dercon 2011). Behaviours, unlike information or disease, spread
as complex contagions (Centola & Macy 2007), meaning that it requires multiple sources of reinforcement to
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induce peoples’ adoption. Therefore, peer eects in the diusion of innovations oen take place throughmul-
tiple channels. In this study, we test the causal eects of two channels, i.e., social learning and externalities, on
driving farmers’ adoption of a new crop.
1.2 Identifying peer eects through dierent channels is a challenging task. First, the traditional selection and re-
flection problems exist. The selection problem refers to the bias that peer groups are formed endogenously
due to the similarities across individuals (Manski 1993; Goette et al. 2012). The reflection problem characterises
the challenge that the pure peer eects could bemingled with the influences of other factors, e.g., interdepen-
dent personal characteristics and common shocks, that could give rise to similar observed outcomes (Manski
1993; Bramoulle et al. 2009; Goldsmith-Pinkham & Imbens 2013). In addition, the eects driven through dier-
ent channels could intertwine in the diusion process, reinforcing or osetting each other (Dahl et al. 2014).
For instance, at the same time as some farmers are informed about a new crop, those who have adopted could
be sharing the experiential know-how of farming the crop. The externalities that force the non-adopters not to
adopt could take place at one hand, while the tacit knowledge that helps reduce the cost to adopt is spread on
the other hand.
1.3 The context we study is the diusion of a crop called Artemisia slengensis (AS) in the rural villages located in
central China. AS was newly introduced into 10 villages in 2001 and had been adopted by all households by
2009. With a survey of the population of 463 households in these 10 villages, we are able to identify the three
major types of relationships, namely, kinship, house neighbourhood and land plot neighbourhood (Xiong &
Payne2017), in eachvillage. Thevillage census also collects eachhousehold’s adoptionyear. Using thenaturally
occurring relationships, rather than acquired relationships such as friendship, immunises our estimation of
peer eects to the selectionproblem1. In addition,weconduct our estimation in eachyear of theentirediusion
process. Correlated unobservables are thus less likely to bias our estimation.
1.4 Both social learning and externalities played an important role in the process that the adoption of the new
crop diused. Social learning took place as farmers shared seed-stalks of AS as well as planting techniques
and market information from the earlier adopters. These resources were scarce and of great value at the time.
They were shared only between family members and house neighbours (oen also members of the extended
family). Externalities were observed between neighbouring land plots belonging to dierent farmers. Farming
AS requiredmuchmorewater than farming the traditional crop (i.e., cotton), and thewater in the ASplots could
flow or penetrate into the adjacent cotton plot and cause damage. Cotton farmers neighbouringmany AS plots
were therefore forced to follow suit.
1.5 We develop an agent-based model to represent the eects of social learning and externalities on a multiplex
networkwith two layers, each hosting a dynamic process (Xiong et al. (2018) present a theoretical application of
thismodel). Peereects through the twochannels are testedbothseparatelyand jointly, andatdierentphases
of the diusion process. We find evidence for eects through both channels. The eect of social learning is
significant over the entire diusion process and plays a dominant role in the early phase, whereas externalities
only matters in the late phase. These findings are robust to the estimations conducted by fitting the model to
dierent subgroups of the population and by considering the inter-village eect.
Background and Data
Background
2.1 We study 10 villages located in the rural area of Wuhan, a city in central China. The farmers in these villages tra-
ditionally farmed paddy rice and cotton. To increase farmers’ income, the local county government introduced
a high-value vegetable into nearly 100 villages in early 2001. The new vegetable, as seed-stalks, was imported
from a city 2,000 km away and was distributed to all households in these villages. As most of the farmers did
not believe farming this vegetable could make profit, only about 20 households in the 10 villages planted AS
in the first year. However, it turned out farming AS was several times more profitable than farming traditional
crops, which encouraged other farmers to follow suit. The earliest adopters then became the only sources of
seed-stalks, which were saved from last year’s harvest. By 2005, more than 60% of the households in most of
these 10 villages had adopted the new crop. By 2009, all households that could potentially adopt the new crop
in these villages had adopted. As a result, the per capita income in these villages soared from less than 700 RMB
in 2000 to nearly 8,000 RMB in 2009. Figure 1 presents the adoption rates and the income growth over all the
villages from 2001 to 2009.
2.2 By 2010, the new crop was not being grown in any village apart from the 10 with adopters in the first year. This
was because the stalk-seeds had not been reserved in other villages (the initially distributed stalk-seed could
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Figure 1: Diusion Curve and Income Growth
stay alive for about merely 10 days), whereas the growers kept the seed-stalks within their own villages. This
study focuses on the diusion in 10 villages before 2010. The diusion in these villages took place indepen-
dently, despite the fact that the villages are geographically quite close. This was possible because land was
collectively owned at the village level (even the per capita farmland varies significantly among these villages,
from fewer than 1mu 2 to over 5mu) and the infrastructure, including irrigation systems and roads, was owned
andmanaged independently by these villages.
Data
2.3 Detaileddatawerecollected fromthestudiedvillages. They include thedata indicatingwheneach farmadopted
AS (diusion data), the data of dierent types of social ties (network data) and those characterising the house-
hold level socioeconomic states (demographic data). The dataset containing these data is publicly available at
Xiong et al. (2016b).
Diusion data
2.4 We conducted questionnaire surveys over all households in each village. In the questionnaire, farmers were
asked theyears inwhich they started to farmASand theacreage they farmedsince then. The survey resultswere
checked against two pieces of documentary evidence. Onewas the historical imagery in the Google Earthmap,
from which land plots on which AS grew in 2003 can be identified. The other were the records of AS growers
from 2004 to 2007 that were made for conducting a government program that subsided vegetable growers.
When there was a contradiction, we returned to the relevant respondent for clarification or correction.
Network data
2.5 Kinship andneighbourhoodare themost important social relationships in rural China (Xiong&Payne 2017). De-
tailed data of each farm’s kinship ties, house and land plot neighbourhood ties were collected. Kinship consists
of blood relationship (based on genes) and ainity relationship (based on marriage). The blood relationship
between households (represented by that of heads of household) is documented in the form of family trees of
the lineage they belong to. There are a total of 63 lineages in the 10 villages (it is oen that a whole lineage was
in one village). We collected the family trees of all the lineages. We also collected the information of marriages,
where both the husband and wife are in the surveyed villages, that took place in the period from 1950 to 2000.
We then calculated the weights of blood relationships according to the closeness in blood, namely, the degree
of consanguinity and the weights of ainity relations according to the weights of blood relations of members
that a marriage involves (the methods are elaborated in Xiong et al. (2016c)).
2.6 The data of house neighbourhoods were collected using Google Earth maps, on which all houses in these vil-
lages can be clearly marked. We then used a GIS tool (ArcGIS) to identify neighbourhoods between the houses.
Two houses fewer than 15meters (roughly the width of a house in regular size plus the width of the narrow gap
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between two houses) apart are viewed as the first degree neighbour to each other, and theweight of the neigh-
bourhood is set to be 1. Likewise, the distance between 15 to 30meters indicates seconddegree neighbourhood
and its weight is set to be 0.5.
2.7 The farmland of a village is split into many small-size plots. The acreage of a plot ranges from 0.1 mu to more
than 2 mu and a household could have 5-8 plots that were oen not adjacent to each other. Each plot’s neigh-
bouringplots in fourorientationsare clearly listed in the landcontract that thehousehold signedwith thevillage
committee. To reflect the feature that smaller plots have less influence on households’ production decisions
than larger ones, we categorised the land plots into small, medium and large sizes according to their acreage,
and assigned the ties linking to plots in each category a dierent weight in the network. Specifically, a plot
smaller than 0.50 mu is a small plot, larger than 0.51 and smaller than 1.00 mu is a medium one, and larger
than 1.01 mu is a large one. Accordingly, the weights of ties linking to plots in each category are 1/4, 1/2 and 1,
respectively.
2.8 All these social relationship existed before the diusion of AS and theywere almost constant during the process
of diusion. This thus immunises our identification of peer eects to the self-selection problem.
Demographic data
2.9 We also obtained comprehensive household level demographic data covering acreage of land and number of
farming workers of households, surnames (used for identify lineages), year of birth and number of schooling
years of the heads of household, in each village from 2000 to 2014.
Observation selection
2.10 Our observations in each village are selected as the following procedure. We began with the list of the house-
holds that signed a land contract (because this is a board list). There are a total of 463 households on the list
over all villages. To select the households that have the conditions of farming AS, we then excluded the follow-
ing households from the list: (i) Those with all farming workers had retired before 2000; (ii) non-independent
households (such as the divorced, orphans, persons serving prison sentences, etc.); (iii) households that have
emigrated from their villages3 before 2000; (vi) households moved away aer 2000 and had not adopted be-
fore they gaveup farming; (v) householdswith noor limited ability to practise farming (such as thedisabled, the
aged, widows or widowers without close ospring in the village, etc.); and (vi) households doing non-farming
jobs (such as running a convenience shop, operating a small restaurant, bricklayers and rag pickers, etc.). Fi-
nally, 367 households, accounting for about 80%of the original list, were remained. The details of the selection
process are displayed in Table 1.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total Percentage
Households Signing Land Contracts 50 57 35 31 61 67 59 19 57 27 463 100.00%
Non-farming Parent(s) Households 0 3 5 4 5 3 4 1 0 2 27 5.83%
Non-independent Households 1 0 2 0 0 2 2 0 1 2 10 2.16%
Households Emigrating before 2000 5 2 1 1 4 1 0 0 1 1 16 3.46%
Emigrating aer 2000 and Non-adopting 1 1 2 1 3 2 2 1 2 0 15 3.24%
Households Lack of Labour 0 4 0 1 5 3 6 0 3 1 23 4.97%
Non-farming Households 1 1 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 5 1.08%
Households Capable of Adopting 42 46 24 24 44 56 43 17 50 21 367 79.27%
Table 1: Selection of Household Observations
Definition of adoption
2.11 This study takes a household that farms AS for no fewer than 1 mu as an adopter 4 and accordingly the year
in which the acreage of AS farming first reached 1 mu as the year a household adopted. This definition helps
separate actual adoption from trial adoption. Among the observed households, we found no household gave
up once they had adopted. 5 This was the case because farming AS was evidently much more profitable than
farmingother crops. Also, it ismoreattractive thanworking in cities fromtheperspective that farmers canbetter
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look aer their families. In our study, therefore, we reasonably assume a household keeps adopting once it has
started.
Descriptive statistics
2.12 Table 2present the statistical characteristics of thehouseholds and the social networks inwhichare embedded.
The villageswe study have an average of 37 households, with a cross-village standard deviation of 14. There are
nearly 8 lineages in a village on average, but the number is quite diverse (varying from3 to 13). A lineage has, on
average, 7 households, also with large variance (the standard deviation is 4.6 across lineages). The average age
of heads of household is 42 year-old in 2000 and the cross-village variation is small (fewer than 3 years). Most
heads of household have completed the education in the junior middle school, i.e., 9 years’ schooling. Those
who have education higher or lower than this level are both rare. There are averagely about 2.3 labours in a
household, with the standard deviation of 0.5 across villages. The acreage of land a typical household has is
about5mu. Ingeneral, these results showthat thevillagesare small but therearepotentiallydenseconnections
via kinship within a village. Households are quite homogeneous in terms of the age of head, education and
labour.
2.13 We measured the network characteristics of the villages based on the networks consisting of the kinship and
house neighbourhood ties, the land plot neighbourhood ties and the ties of all the three relationships. The
three types of networks are chosen because we will estimate peer eects based on them. The kinship ties and
house neighbourhood ties in the networks are combined together because they are highly overlapped in the
villages(Xiong&Payne2017). The results show that the kinship andhouseneighbourhoodnetworks aredensely
connected (the average degree, strength and density are high) and completely clustered (clustering coeicient
is 1; obviously in the unit of lineage). However, the distance (indicated by average path length and diameter)
between the households are high, implying that there are few linkages between clusters. Furthermore, the high
degree centralisation suggests there are opinion leader type individuals in lineages. On the contrary, the land
plot neighbourhoodnetworks are less connected and clusteredbut thedistancebetweenhouseholds aremuch
shorter. The results of the whole networks (i.e., combined kinship, house neighbourhood and land plot neigh-
bourhood networks) generally fall between those of kinship and house neighbourhood networks and those of
land plot neighbourhood networks. Overall, these results suggest that kinship and house neighbourhood net-
works can facilitate thediusionof innovationswithin clusters, eachofwhichpossibly containsopinion leaders.
Land plot neighbourhood networks, on the other hand, can help the spreading between clusters.
Mechanisms underlying peer eects
2.14 In our case, all the households were informed about the new crop by their village leaders on the first day it was
introduced into the villages. The spreadof the information about the existenceof the innovation thus, if existed,
would have very limited influence on motivating a farmer to adopt. Farmers in these villages, due to their low
capacity to bear any significant loss, generally would not adopt a new crop before they were convinced about
its profitability (e.g., being shown the price and production is higher than those of traditional crops). This is
confirmed by the fact that fewer than 20 out of the 376 households tried to plant the new crop in the first year,
even through seed-stalks were freely given to them. For these reasons, we do not think the transmission of
awareness of the crop is an important factor influencing the diusion process. In our model, the adopters in
the first two years are set as seed adopters.
Social learning
2.15 Social learning could take place through channels that earlier adopters could share their planting techniques,
market informationor seed-stalkswith thepotential adopters. The techniques ofmanagingwater andapplying
fertiliser and pesticide in farming AS is quite dierent from those used in farming rice and cotton. These specific
techniqueswere tacit knowledge and could only be obtained by participating in person or learning from earlier
practitioners. Similarly, themarket information about the specific cropwas limit and farmers could only obtain
it from their fellows who had experience of selling AS. Accessibility to tacit techniques or market information
from earlier adopters, therefore, could increase one’s propensity to adopt. Here we draw a distinction between
adoption in decision and adoption in action, which is rarely considered in the literature as decision and action
oen occur simultaneously. In our case, even if a farmer had decided to adopt, hemight not be able to actually
do so, due to the inaccessibility of seed-stalks, and the season when the decision to adopt took place. If one
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Mean Standard Deviation Maximum Minimum
Panel A: Demographic Characteristics
Number of Households (Nodes in networks) 36.70 13.80 18 67
Number of Lineage 7.60 5.21 3 14
Number of Households per Lineage 6.61 4.65 4 20.67
Average Age 42.13 2.70 47.29 39.83
Average Education Level 1.96 0.20 2.25 1.61
Average Amount of Labour 2.31 0.51 3.53 1.95
Average Land per Household (mu) 5.00 0.67 5.84 3.53
Panel B: Networks Characteristics
Kinship + House Neighbourhood Networks
Average Degree (average number of ties) 21.98 11.93 45.61 6.78
Strength (number of ties consideringweights) 3.66 0.90 4.94 1.72
Density (chance of a tie exists between nodes) 0.55 0.24 1.00 0.24
Clustering Coeicient (chance of mutual ties) 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
Average Path Length 4.47 2.12 10.02 2.49
Diameter (maxima path length) 7.05 2.73 13.28 4.57
Centralisation (concentration or inequality) 0.70 0.15 0.93 0.41
Land Plot Neighbourhood Networks
Average Degree 8.65 s 14.37 5.68
Strength 2.33 1.11 4.78 1.26
Density 0.24 0.13 0.59 0.10
Clustering Coeicient 0.35 0.11 0.64 0.21
Average Path Length 2.16 0.58 3.30 1.27
Diameter 5.98 2.44 9.62 2.51
Centralisation 0.73 0.13 0.92 0.52
Whole Networks
Average Degree 26.67 9.95 48.58 13.11
Strength 6.25 0.98 8.23 4.71
Density 0.65 0.19 1.00 0.42
Clustering Coeicient 0.82 0.13 1.00 0.65
Average Path Length 1.04 0.22 1.36 0.74
Diameter 2.15 0.45 2.85 1.46
Centralisation 0.54 0.14 0.84 0.36
Panel C: Other Characteristics
Average Distance to Arterial Road (km) 8.45 2.95 11.50 5.55
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of networks and households characteristics
did not farm AS when it was first introduced, the only feasible source to obtain the seed-stalks was from the
adopters aer the first year, because (i) it was not possible to obtain the seed-stalks from the original place
where the AS stalks were brought from (an city which is about 2,000 km away) or other nearby places, (ii) the
seed-stalks were not sold in market, and (iii) there was no substitute for that variety of AS.
2.16 In the first few years, when growers were rare, the opportunity cost of saving seed-stalks and sharing them
with others was high. Seed-stalks were produced by keeping the plants growing until the stalk became tough.
This would take three months or longer, during which fresh stalks could be harvested 2-3 times. At the time
that seed-stalks were scarce, saving seed-stalks for others did not only mean reducing the amount of products
for sale (at a price several times higher than that of traditional corps), but also limiting the acreage they could
plant in the next year. The opportunity cost of saving seed-stalks was so high that they were not transacted
in market. Also, potential adopters would not make such a big investment on such a risky programme even if
they could aord it, which was not the case for most households. As a result, the spread of seed-stalks did not
occur through a market conduit, but almost exclusively as a social behaviour, especially in the first few years.
Specifically, the sharing of seed-stalks primarily occurred between family members, i.e., through kinship, the
strongest relationship in the villages. Cultural expectations are that family members would receive priority in
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granting big favours. Social learning thus primarily refers to the sharing of seed-stalks in our case.
Externalities
2.17 When the majority of the households in a village had adopted AS, the remaining households were under pres-
sure to follow suit. The pressure was mainly caused by the externalities in using irrigation. There was a long
period during which both AS and cotton were active on land (AS is active from September to next April and
cotton from March to November). However, farming AS requires much more water than farming cotton (the
AS plots must be kept half flooded most of the planting season, whereas the cotton plots need to be dry in its
three-month long harvesting period). The water in AS plots could flow or penetrate into the adjacent cotton
plot and cause negative consequences. Therefore, if many neighbouring plots have planted AS, a pressure will
be imposed to a cotton farmer to also plant AS; otherwise, he will suer loss.
Peer eects in the early and late phases
2.18 Overall, the diusion process of AS can be divided into two phases: the early phase (approximately from 2001
to 2006) when mainly paddy fields were used for farming AS, and the late phase (approximately from 2006 to
2009) when many dry fields were used for farming AS. In the early phase, the irrigation channels only reached
paddy fields, so mainly paddy fields could be used for farming AS. In addition, the planting seasons of rice and
AS are complementary (rice grows from April to August). There was no conflict in using water between farming
the two crops. In the late phase, the irrigation systems were largely improved and could cover many more dry
fields. The dry fields then began to be also used to farm AS. Meanwhile, the overlap of planting seasons and the
significantdierence inwater requirementsbetweencottonandAS led to theconflict in irrigation. Furthermore,
the early phase was also the period when seed-stalks was in shortage. Potential adopters had to rely on their
kinship ties to obtain seed-stalks. In the late phase, however, the accessibility of seed-stalks was not a critical
restriction for adoption any more. Based on all these facts, it is reasonable to hypothesise that social learning
primarily took eect in the early phase whereas externalities in the late phase.
2.19 This study will test the two hypothesised underlying mechanisms, i.e., social learning and externalities, and
their performance in the early, late and entire phases separately.
Methods
Model
3.1 The agent-based model represents a village as a social network and the households in the village as nodes on
the network. The social network consists of two layers. One is composed of kinship ties plus house neighbour-
hood ties or kinship ties - both cases are tested, and the other is composedof landplot neighbourhood ties. The
two layers constitute a multiplex network, i.e., network with multiple relations among the same set of actors
(see Figure 2). The diusion takes place on the two layers simultaneously, and a household is considered as
adopting once it has adopted on either layer.
3.2 We hypothesise that social learning takes place on the kinship (or kinship plus house neighbourhood) layer,
whereas externalities on the land plot neighbourhood layer. They are represented by dierent approaches in
themodel. Twoapproachesareoenutilised tomodel anagent’s adoptiondecision. One is aprobability based,
wherein an agent’s probability of taking an action changes as the proportion of his peers who have taken the
action changes (e.g., Banerjee et al. 2013; Peres 2014). The other is a threshold based, wherein an agent takes
an action as long as a certain threshold of the utility is reached (e.g., Granovetter 1978; Singh et al. 2013). In
our case, a household’s likelihood to adopt the new crop increased with the number of family members or
house neighbours who had adopted. This decision-making process can bemodelled following the probability-
based approach. The probability for a household to adopt is thus proportional to the sum of the strengths
of its kinship ties with those who have adopted. On the contrary, the externalities that adopting households’
adoption behaviour imposed on non-adopters was mainly determined by the nature of the crop (such as its
compatibility with the traditional crop). Such influence thus can be interpreted as a threshold that applies
to all households, that is, a household will definitely adopt once the fraction of its plot neighbours that had
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Figure 2: Schematic diagram of a two-layer multiplex network
adopted reaches a threshold. Therefore, externalities occurring on neighbourhood network is modelled using
a threshold.
3.3 The agent-basedmodel is a discrete-timemodel wherein each agent has one of two states at each time period,
adopting or non-adopting. We treat the households who adopted in the first 2 years (2001 and 2002) as seed
adopters. At the beginning of the simulation, seed adopters are in the adopting state. In each iterate period, the
adopting agents remain in their state, whereas the non-adopting agents update their adoption states based on
two rules corresponding to the mechanisms of social learning and externalities, respectively, as follows:
(i) Social learning In each period, a non-adopter becomes adopting with a probability (elaborated below).
The probability updates according to the proportion of his adopting peers on the kinship network in the
last round.
(ii) Externalities In each period, a non-adopter becomes adopting once the proportion of his adopting peers
on the neighbourhood network reaches a threshold in the last period.
3.4 We now elaborate how the probability for a household to adopt is determined. Let pit denote the probability
that the household i adopts at time t. It is a function of household’s characteristicsXi, time-varying factorsZt
and the eect of social learning F kinit (specifically, the proportion of the household i’s adopting peers over all
peers on the kinship layer at the time t), given by
pi,t = Pr(adoptionXi, F kini,t ) = f(α+X
′
iβ + Z
′
tγ + λF
kin
i,t )
where f is assumed to be a logistical function that is widely used. It yields:
log
(
pi,t
1− pi,t
)
= α+X ′iβ + Z
′
tγ + λF
kin
i,t
3.5 The threshold for externalities, h, is a predefined ratio varying between 0 and 1. Households compare this ratio
with the proportion of the household’s adopting peers on the land layer F landi,t . The household i adopts when
Fneiit > h; otherwise, it remains unchanged.
3.6 The vector of household-level covariates, Xi, consists of age of household head, number of farming workers
and sum of path lengths to earliest adopters. Farming AS is a more labour intensive work than farming tradi-
tional crops, so a household’s adoption behaviour was likely to be influenced by its abundance of labour. This
is reflected by age of household head and number of farming workers. Considering the possible influence of
earlies adopters, we include a covariate indicating household’s social connection to the earliest adopters in its
village. The time-varying covariateZt here only refers to last year’s average price in the wholesale market.
3.7 In our case, households’ adoption behaviour updated annually and the diusion process lasted from 2003 to
2009. Accordingly, our model iterates on a yearly basis and the iteration proceeds for 7 years (the first 2 years
are treated as the initial period in the model). The two eects occur simultaneously in reality, so we set the
order to update them as random in the model. We repeat the simulation for 100 times and take the means of
them for the output variables (e.g., adoption rate).
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Model calibration
3.8 Calibration in this paper refers to setting values to parameterswith real-world data. It is pertinent to the param-
eters that characterise households themselves and their behavioural environment. The three types of social
networks, kinship network, house neighbourhood networks and land plot neighbourhood networks are cali-
brated with the actual networks in 2001 for each studied village. These network are static during the diusion
process. The demographic characteristics for households are calibratedwith the real data in 2001. They, except
age (which grows each year), do not change over time. The distance to arterial road for each village is calibrated
in the same manner. The price for each year is calibrated with the actual price in the corresponding year. The
seed adopters in themodel are aligned with those in 2002, the initial period of the simulation, for each village.
Model estimation
3.9 The task of estimation is to find the values for parameters so the output best fit data. There parameters, in
our case, are those define households’ behavioural process, i.e., the underlying mechanism of peer eects.
Instead of simply finding the optimal value for each of the parameters, we obtain a optimal values for each
parameter by fitting themodel to eachof a largenumber of datasets (1000 inour case), which are generatedbya
statistical process (bootstrapping). With sucha largenumberofoptimal values,wecanestimate thedistribution
of the optimal values and further determine whether the parameter matters in the behavioural process from a
statistical perspective.
3.10 Specifically, the simulated adoption rate is compared to the observed adoption rate year by year (from 2003 to
2009) for each village. As there is no obvious way to determine the values of the parameters that would make
the best fit, we conduct a grid search. Initially, we set a reasonably large space and search the space coarsely
by large increments. We then narrow down the interval and search by smaller increments. We search over the
entire discrete parameter space, denoted by Θ. For each grid point θ ∈ Θ, we repeat the simulation 100 times,
each time letting the diusion run for 7 years (corresponding to the years from 2003 to 2009). The adoption
rate at each year is collected in the simulations. We calculate the average adoption rate at each year over the
100 simulations subsequently. In a mathematical expression, Y
sim
t,r (θ) =
∑S
s=1 Y
sim
t,r (s,θ)
S , where Y
sim
t,r denotes
the simulated adoption rate for the village r in the year t, s ∈ [1, S] denote the index of simulation repetitions
and S = 100 in the present case. Next, we calculate the mean absolute errors (MAE) and choose the set of
parameters that minimise the metric, given by
MAE(θ) =
1
r
R∑
r=1
T∑
t=1
|Y simt,r (θ)− Y empt,r |
where Y empt,r denotes the empirical adoption rate.
3.11 To estimate distributions of the optimal values of the interested parameters (i.e., the elements of θ̂), we utilise
a Bayesian bootstrap algorithm, which exploits the independence across villages. This method enable us to
generate a large number (1000 in this case) of re-samples (i.e., bootstrap samples) out of the 10 village obser-
vations. Therefore, 1000 optimal values can be obtained for each parameter. The distribution of a parameter’s
optimal value can then be described.
3.12 Specifically, the model estimation is conducted in the following steps:
(i) compute the deviation from simulated and empirical adoption rate, denoted by d, for each of village r =
1, · · · , 10, and at each parameter grid.
d(r, θ) =
1
S
∑
s∈[S]
msim,r(s, θ)−memp,r
wherem denotes the moment.
(ii) bootstrap from the set of the 10 villages for 1000 times. All sample villages’ deviations at each parameter
grid are recorded.
(iii) for each bootstrap sample b = 1, · · · , 1000, calculate a weighted average of deviations, denoted byD
D(b) =
1
R
ωbr · dr(θ)
where ωbr =
ebr
er
, with ebr the i.i.d. exponential random variables and er = 1R
∑
ebr.
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(iv) find the set of parameters that minimises MAE at each sample
θ∗ = argθ∈Θ minMAE(θ)
3.13 We consequently obtain 1000 samples of optimal sets of the parameters, i.e., {θ∗b}b∈[1,1000]. To conduct the
statistical inference, we calculate the 95% confidence intervals of the interested parameters.
3.14 We first run themodel with only the social learningmechanism, and then include the externalitiesmechanism.
We refer to these models in terms of their parameters as follows:
(i) Learning model: (pi,t(α, β, γ, λ))
(ii) Learning-externalities model: (pi,t(α, β, γ, λ), h)
3.15 In addition, the learning-externalities model is estimated by fitting the adoption rates of the first 4 years, the
last 4 years and all 7 years, to understand the eects at the early, the late phase and the entire process.
Results
Fitness of models
4.1 Table 3 presents each village’smean of the absolute errors over all 7 simulation years for the optimal parameter
combination that minimises the MAE defined above. It contains the values for all the 5 models that will be
estimated in this study. The results show that all the valuesare smaller than0.10,most are smaller than0.05and
the average of the values is 0.03. This means, on average, the dierence between simulation and real adoption
rates is about 3%. Our models, therefore, provide very good fits to the observed data.
Table 3: MAE for the estimatedmodels
Learning Model Learning-Externalities Model
(Kinship) (Kinship+House Neib.) (All Years) (First 4 Years) (Last 4 Years)
Village 1 0.045 0.032 0.018 0.020 0.007
Village 2 0.007 0.007 0.056 0.067 0.063
Village 3 0.046 0.018 0.035 0.041 0.005
Village 4 0.055 0.056 0.022 0.024 0.002
Village 5 0.017 0.017 0.008 0.007 0.004
Village 6 0.020 0.020 0.031 0.021 0.011
Village 7 0.028 0.027 0.063 0.055 0.000
Village 8 0.071 0.060 0.088 0.105 0.023
Village 9 0.038 0.038 0.046 0.041 0.001
Village 10 0.009 0.010 0.008 0.006 0.001
Estimation results
4.2 Estimation results are presented in Table 4. Remember that parameter λ (in the logistical function) indicates
the eect of social learning and parameter h reflects the eects of externalities. Panel A presents the results of
estimating the learningmodelwithadoption ratesof all 7 years. Theestimation is conducted first in the scenario
that social learning solely occurs throughkinship ties and then in the scenario that it occurs throughkinship ties
plushouseneighbourhood ties. Theparameterλ is significantlydierent from0 inbothscenarios,meaning that
social learning imposes a significant impact on the adoption rates over the years. It takes place through both
kinship ties solely, and kinship ties and house neighbourhood ties together (kinship and house neighbourhood
are highly correlated in these villages according to Xiong & Payne (2017)). For the sake of comprehensiveness,
subsequent estimations are based on kinship ties plus house neighbourhood ties.
4.3 Panel B presents the estimation results of the learning-externalities model that includes both eects of social
learning and externalities. When the model is fitted to the adoption rates in the entire diusion process (i.e.,
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Table 4: Estimation results
λ h
Panel A: Learning Model
Kinship 6.10
Standard Error [0.56]
95% CI of Bootstrap Distribution [3.84, 7.16]
Kinship + House Neib. 6.27
Standard Error [0.57]
95% CI of Bootstrap Distribution [2.97, 7.21]
Panel B: Learning-Externalities Model
All Years 5.60 0.32
Standard Error [0.54] [0.21]
95% CI of Bootstrap Distribution [2.83, 6.34] [−0.22, 0.91]
First 4 Years 6.80 0.24
Standard Error [0.42] [0.25]
95% CI of Bootstrap Distribution [4.76, 7.30] [−0.16, 1.13]
Last 4 years 4.10 0.48
Standard Error [0.30] [0.08]
95% CI of Bootstrap Distribution [2.89, 4.98] [0.14, 0.61]
7 years), the parameter λ is still significant, whereas the parameter h is not. This result holds when the esti-
mation is conducted using the data of the first 4 years, and the influence of social learning is more prominent.
However, externalities become significant when fitting the model to the data of the last 4 years, whereas the
influence of the social learning, although still significant, substantially diminishes. Overall, the results suggest
that social learninghas significant impact on theentire diusionprocess andmainly in the early phase,whereas
externalities only significantly influences the diusion in the late phase.
Robustness checks
Alternative fittings
4.4 One potential concern with these results is that the estimation approach inherits the correlated eects and
endogeneity problems that plague any eort to estimate peer eects from observation data. To address this,
we perform robustness checks by fitting themodel to the adoption rates in dierent subgroups of households.
The subgroups are determined according to whether a household belongs to the largest lineage in its village
and the household head’s age. They are as follows:
Lineage Groups
(i) the percentage of households that adopt in the largest lineage
(ii) the percentage of households that adopt in the other lineages
Age Groups
(i) the percentage of households whose heads are older than 40 years of age in 2000
(ii) the percentage of households whose heads are no older than 40 years of age in 2000
4.5 For each grouping method, we compare the simulated adoption rates for each subgroup in the year of 2003,
2005 and 2007 (thus there are 2 × 3 ‘moments’ to fit) with the empirical data. The estimation results are dis-
played in Table 5. For both the lineage groups and age groups, the results that whether the estimated values
of the two interested parameters, λ and h, cross zero in the 95% confidence intervals are the same as in the
original fitting. The significances of the parameters are consistent with those for the original fitting in both the
learningmodel and the learning-externalitiesmodel. Therefore, the results we obtain in the original estimation
are robust to these alternative fittings.
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Table 5: Estimation of alternative fittings
λ h
Panel A: Lineage Groups
Learning Model 3.25
Standard Error [0.32]
95% CI of Bootstrap Distribution [2.54, 4.05]
Learning-Externalities Model
All Years 2.89 0.58
Standard Error [0.40] [0.26]
95% CI of Bootstrap Distribution [1.82, 3.33] [-0.32, 1.01]
First 4 Years 3.25 0.44
Standard Error [0.30] [0.36]
95% CI of Bootstrap Distribution [2.82, 3.83] [-0.14, 0.072]
Last 4 Years 2.75 0.62
Standard Error [0.30] [0.013]
95% CI of Bootstrap Distribution [0.82, 2.33] [0.46, 0.92]
Panel B: Age Groups
Learning Model 7.27
Standard Error [0.62]
95% CI of Bootstrap Distribution [5.50, 8.49]
Learning-Externalities Model
All Years 6.35 0.46
Standard Error [0.52] [0.34]
95% CI of Bootstrap Distribution [5.82, 7.33] [-0.12, 0.81]
First 4 Years 6.96 0.36
Standard Error [0.65] [0.38]
95% CI of Bootstrap Distribution [0.82, 2.33] [-0.32, 1.01]
Last 4 Years 5.37 0.58
Standard Error [0.76] [0.016]
95% CI of Bootstrap Distribution [3.42, 6.33] [0.36, 0.78]
Inter-village eect
4.6 Due to the geographic proximities, it is possible that the adoption behaviours of the households in one village
is influenced by the households in another village. The most likely channel for the inter-village influence is
the kinship ties between households in dierent villages. To estimate this influence, we implement another
estimation with the inter-village ties included in the kinship networks. The results are presented in Table 6. In
bothmodels,λ remains significant and theexternality eect remainsnot significant,whichare exactly the same
as in the original estimate. Meanwhile, the values of the parameters do not alter from the original estimation
essentially. Therefore, we do not find evidence that the inter-village eect substantially changes the results
obtained in the previous section.
Discussion and Conclusions
5.1 Our study identifies social learning and externalities in the diusion of crops on rural networks. The two diu-
sionmechanisms take place through kinship ties plus house neighbourhood ties and land plot neighbourhood
ties among the households, respectively. Social learning plays a significant role in the entire diusion process
and primarily in the early phase, whereas externalities only shape the late phase of the process. This shows
that peer eects on a diusion process can be caused by dierent types of interactions that take place through
dierent social relationships at dierent stages of the diusion process. In fact, the diusion process is likely to
be first triggered by the interaction on the social network of close relationships (e.g., kinship) and then further
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Table 6: Estimation of inter-village eect
λ h
Learning Model 5.28
Standard Error [0.52]
95% CI of Bootstrap Distribution [4.58, 7.04]
Learning-Externalities Model
All Years 4.75 0.38
Standard Error [0.46] [0.36]
95% CI of Bootstrap Distribution [3.32, 5.33] [-0.12, 0.71]
First 4 Years 4.95 0.28
Standard Error [0.30] [0.26]
95% CI of Bootstrap Distribution [0.82, 2.33] [-0.30, 1.01]
Last 4 Years 4.12 0.62
Standard Error [0.30] [0.06]
95% CI of Bootstrap Distribution [2.82, 2.33] [0.12, 0.91]
enhanced by the interaction on another social network. Such a process can be schematically illustrated by Fig-
ure 3. In thismultiplex network, the diusion starts on Layer A, where Note 1motivates Note 2, 3 and 4 to adopt.
Then the three new adopters motivate the remaining notes, 5 and 6 through interactions on Layer B.
Figure 3: Schematic diagram of diusion on a two-layer multiplex network
5.2 The study has bothmethodological and policy implications. In themethodological aspect, it highlights the im-
portance of understanding the interactive eects in social groups through the specific channels that facilitate
the eects to occur. An eective approach is to distinguish the specific eects according to social relationships
through which they transmit. A dynamic perspective is also needed as the roles that dierent channels play
can vary as the diusion proceeds. The diusion achieved through one channel can trigger further diusion
through another channel. This study also demonstrates that agent-based simulation can be an eective ap-
proach to explore the underlyingmechanisms of peer eects. It enables the explicit representation of multiple
mechanisms on social networks. If the diusion data from a number of samples are available, the significance
of these mechanisms can be rigorously tested.
5.3 Our study also shows that successful diusion can start at the dense social network that consists of the ties of
a close relationship (e.g., kinship) and then reach the individuals the dense network does not cover through a
dierent relationship. Therefore, giving priority to the promotion of the diusion on dense and strong relation-
ships can facilitate the diusion in the entire social group eiciently. Specifically in the case of Chinese rural
communities, supporting the innovators in large lineages can be especially helpful for accelerating the spread
of a new farming practice. Through the kinship ties, households can obtain information and resources that
help them attenuate risks and reduce the initial cost. Once households adopting the new practice becomes the
majority, the “laggards” are likely to be coerced to follow suit due to externalities imposed by the adopters.
5.4 In this work we move beyond the existing literature in several ways. First, in our model, the likelihood that
an individual adopts the innovation depends on how likely he can obtain resources from earlier adopters and
howmuch pressure it receives in coordinating behaviour with adopters. Existing studies generally either focus
solely one diusion mechanism or measure the overall peer eects by ignoring the nuance between dierent
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mechanisms in empirical analyses (save for Banerjee et al. 2013, which separates out the spreading of initial in-
formation, but still leaves othermechanisms undivided). Such conflation can considerably bias the estimation,
especially when the dierent mechanisms can oset each other (refer to Xiong et al. 2016a, for a simulation
demonstration of such situation). Without explicitly modelling individuals’ behavioural mechanisms, these ef-
fects are diicult to distinguish since they lead to similar results from a statistical point of view. In both cases,
one with more peers who have adopted is likely to adopt himself. By simulating the interaction and decision-
making at the individual level, we are able to separately estimate dierent underlying mechanisms of peer ef-
fects. Second, we identify the social relationships through which dierent eects take place. This is largely
based on our in-depth observations in the study sites and good knowledge of the social fabric in these villages.
We are able to empiricallymake the identification becausewe have access to the data of various social relation-
ships in these villages, whereas data in such detail is rarely available for researchers, and thus we find no pre-
vious studies that empirically distinguish peer eects through dierent relationships. Third, we examine peer
eects at dierent phases of the diusion process. We divided the entire diusion process into early and late
phases, and check how each eect varies over the phases. Existing studies generally do not test such dynamics,
assuming the underlying mechanism of peer eects is constant during the examined period. This is partially
due to the diiculty of observing the entire diusion process or a suiciently long period of the process.
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Notes
1A concern can arise here that the unobserved friendship can potentially play an important role in the dif-
fusion. In general, the ignorance of acquired relationships can bias the analysis. In our case, however, such
bias is unlikely to happen due to two facts: (i) pure friendship is not strong enough to support social learning
(mainly refer to the sharing of seed-stalks) and is irrelevant for externalities, and (ii) farmers’ friendship ties
oen correlate with his kinship and neighbourhood ties.
2mu is the unit of area used for land in China. 15 mu is equal to 1 hectare.
3We take a household as actually emigrated if (a) the head of household or othermajor labour-supplier had
a full-time job or ran a stable business outside the village (usually in the city); and (b)most of itsmembers have
not lived in the village for some years; or (c) they have taken an obvious action of moving out, such as selling
their house, contracting out the farmland for a long period of time or unregistering the residency in the village.
4The minimum per capita farmland in these villages is 1 mu paddy field. In other words, even the smallest
household (those with a single member) has at least 1 mu plot capable of farming AS.
5Therewere cases that AS farming familiesmoved to the nearby urban areas. They ended up either transfer-
ring their farmland to their closest relatives remaining in the village or keeping farming by themselves through
commuting between their houses and AS fields. In the former case, the AS plots continued to be used to farm
AS and the original household was still be treated as an adopter.
Appendix: Parameter grids used in estimations
Primarymodel estimations
1. Learning Model
(i) Kinship:
α ∈ [(−5.00,−4.60, 0.05), (−4.62,−4.00, 0.02)]
β ∈ [(0.05, 0.20, 0.05), (0.22, 0.80, 0.02)]
γ ∈ [(1.20, 1.50, 0.02), (1.55, 2.00, 0.05)]
λ ∈ [(5.80, 6.00, 0.02), (6.02, 6.20, 0.02), (6.25, 6.50, 0.05)]
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(ii) Kinship + House Neib.:
α ∈ [(−5.50,−5.05, 0.05), (−5.00,−4.60, 0.02), (−4.55,−4.20, 0.05)]
β ∈ [(0.05, 0.30, 0.02), (0.35, 0.70, 0.05)]
γ ∈ [(0.80, 1.00, 0.05), (1.02, 1.30, 0.02), (1.35, 2.00, 0.05)]
λ ∈ [(6.00, 6.20, 0.05), (6.25, 6.50, 0.02)]
2. Learning-Externalities Model
(i) All Years:
α ∈ [−5.00,−4.00, 0.05]
β ∈ [−0.50, 1.50, 0.05]
γ ∈ [0.80, 2.20, 0.05]
λ ∈ [(5.50, 5.70, 0.02), (5.75, 6.20, 0.05)]
h ∈ [(0.05, 0.25, 0.05), (0.30, 0.40, 0.02), (0.65, 1.00, 0.05)]
(ii) First 4 Years:
α ∈ [−5.00,−4.00, 0.05]
β ∈ [−0.10, 1.00, 0.05]
γ ∈ [0.60, 2.00, 0.05]
λ ∈ [6.50, 7.00, 0.02]
δ ∈ [(0.02, 0.50, 0.02), (0.55, 0.70, 0.05)]
(iii) Last 4 Years:
α ∈ [−5.00,−4.00, 0.05]
β ∈ [0.05, 1.50, 0.05]
γ ∈ [0.60, 2.00, 0.05]
λ ∈ [(4.00, 4.20, 0.02), (4.25, 4.50, 0.05)]
δ ∈ [(0.05, 0.35, 0.05), (0.40, 0.60, 0.02), (0.65, 0.80, 0.05)]
Estimation of alternative fittings
1. Lineage Groups
(i) Learning Model:
α ∈ [−4.50,−3.00, 0.05]
β ∈ [0.25, 1.50, 0.05]
γ ∈ [1.00, 2.00, 0.05]
λ ∈ [(3.00, 3.30, 0.05), (3.32, 3.50, 0.02)]
(a) Learning-Externalities Model
(i) All Years:
α ∈ [−4.00,−3.00, 0.05]
β ∈ [0.50, 2.00, 0.05]
γ ∈ [1.00, 2.00, 0.05]
λ ∈ [(2.50, 2.80, 0.05), (2.85, 3.30, 0.02)]
h ∈ [(0.05, 0.35, 0.05), (0.40, 0.60, 0.02), (0.65, 0.80, 0.05)]
(ii) First 4 Years:
α ∈ [−4.00,−3.00, 0.05]
β ∈ [0.50, 2.00, 0.05]
γ ∈ [1.00, 2.00, 0.05]
λ ∈ [(3.00, 3.20, 0.02), (3.25, 3.50, 0.05)]
h ∈ [(0.05, 0.30, 0.05), (0.32, 0.50, 0.02), (0.55, 0.80, 0.05)]
(iii) Last 4 Years:
α ∈ [−4.00,−3.00, 0.05]
β ∈ [0.50, 2.00, 0.05]
γ ∈ [1.00, 2.00, 0.05]
λ ∈ [2.60, 3.50, 0.05]
h ∈ [(0.05, 0.45, 0.05), (0.50, 0.80, 0.02)]
2. Age Groups
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(i) Learning Model:
α ∈ [−6.50,−5.00, 0.05]
β ∈ [0.05, 1.00, 0.05]
γ ∈ [0.50, 1.50, 0.05]
λ ∈ [(7.00, 7.20, 0.05), (7.25, 7.50, 0.02)]
(a) Learning-Externalities Model
(i) All Years:
α ∈ [−4.00,−3.00, 0.05]
β ∈ [0.50, 2.00, 0.05]
γ ∈ [1.00, 2.00, 0.05]
λ ∈ [6.00, 7.00, 0.05]
h ∈ [(0.10, 0.25, 0.05), (0.30, 0.60, 0.02)]
(ii) First 4 Years:
α ∈ [−4.00,−3.00, 0.05]
β ∈ [0.50, 2.00, 0.05]
γ ∈ [1.00, 2.00, 0.05]
λ ∈ [(6.50, 6.80, 0.05), (6.82, 7.10, 0.02)]
h ∈ [(0.05, 0.30, 0.05), (0.32, 0.60, 0.02), (0.65, 0.80, 0.05)]
(iii) Last 4 Years:
α ∈ [−4.00,−3.00, 0.05]
β ∈ [0.50, 2.00, 0.05]
γ ∈ [1.00, 2.00, 0.05]
λ ∈ [(5.00, 5.30, 0.05), (5.35, 5.50, 0.02), (5.50, 5.80, 0.05)]
h ∈ [(0.05, 0.50, 0.05), (0.52, 0.80, 0.02)]
Estimation of inter-village eect
1. Learning Model:
α ∈ [−5.00,−4.00, 0.05]
β ∈ [0.05, 1.00, 0.05]
γ ∈ [0.80, 2.00, 0.05]
λ ∈ [(5.00, 5.20, 0.05), (5.22, 5.50, 0.02), (5.55, 5.80, 0.05)]
2. Learning-Externalities Model
(i) All Years:
α ∈ [−4.50,−3.50, 0.05]
β ∈ [0.50, 2.00, 0.05]
γ ∈ [1.00, 2.00, 0.05]
λ ∈ [4.00, 5.00, 0.05]
h ∈ [(0.10, 0.30, 0.05), (0.32, 0.60, 0.02)]
(ii) First 4 Years:
α ∈ [−4.50,−3.50, 0.05]
β ∈ [0.50, 2.00, 0.05]
γ ∈ [1.00, 2.00, 0.05]
λ ∈ [4.50, 5.50, 0.05]
h ∈ [(0.05, 0.20, 0.05), (0.22, 0.60, 0.02)]
(iii) Last 4 Years:
α ∈ [−4.50,−3.50, 0.05]
β ∈ [0.50, 2.00, 0.05]
γ ∈ [1.00, 2.00, 0.05]
λ ∈ [(3.80, 4.00, 0.05), (4.02, 4.20, 0.02), (4.25, 4.50, 0.05)]
h ∈ [(0.30, 0.50, 0.05), (0.52, 0.80, 0.02)]
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